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1	 Foreword
 The Japanese people have always greeted foreign influences with great 
enthusiasm. In the first centuries AD the massive introduction of Chinese 
civilization deeply affected all aspects of Japanese culture. Writing, religion, 
architecture and arts, court titles and rank systems all experienced great 
development. Administrative, bureaucratic, and legal institutions from the 
continent were all used as models by the Japanese state during this time. 
Later, cultural interaction occurred with other Asian countries, but predomi-
nantly with China and Korea. During the middle of the sixteenth century, a 
ship of Portuguese merchants was wrecked on Tanegashima Island. 
Subsequently, Western traders and missionaries brought not only technolog-
ical innovations such as firearms, but also ideologies and spiritual ideas such 
as the Christian religion.
 In spite of their remarkable capacity for adaptation, the Japanese people 
have never compromised on the elements specific to their cultural back-
ground. An example of this phenomenon is the unquestioned sanctity and 
divinity of the Emperor—strongly connected with the Shintō religion—which 
remained a steady and unchanged feature until modern times. Chinese civili-
zation was acknowledged for its excellence, however.
 Genealogy has always been regarded highly by the Japanese people. Whilst 
the Chinese state examination system and the theoretical possibility of the 
lower classes aspiring to better social conditions had no equivalent in Japan 
(except for inferior appointments), the hierarchical social structure offered by 
Confucianism was undoubtedly an essential ideological basis for the estab-
lishment of Japanese political power. Titles and higher offices were always 
exclusive to both civil and military nobles.
  * Ph.D., Sapienza University, Rome
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 By analyzing historical events, ancient written works, and the spiritual 
and philosophical roots of Japanese civilization, the importance of blood ties 
and hierarchy in the legitimization of political power throughout Japanese 
history becomes clear.
 After a brief note on ancient Japan, this paper deals with the Japanese 
warrior class. From blood ties to the abstract concept of absolute devotion to 
the lord, duty always was the keystone of samurai thought. While some 
aspects are connected with Confucian teachings, others are typically 
Japanese.
2	 Uji	clans	and	antecedents	of	the	Japanese	medieval	era:	blood	ties	
as	fundamental	to	the	warrior	group
 At the time of the Uji clans, during the Yayoi and Kofun periods, social 
prestige derived from descent from a tutelary deity and from family ties with 
the head of an Uji. As interaction among villages increased, and when the 
Yamato clan came to rule, the Uji increased their own prestige by having 
women of their clan marry members of the imperial Uji.
 Development of the shōen estates during the Nara and Heian periods 
enabled the imperial and aristocratic clans to continue living in great luxury 
at the top of society even during periods of political laxity, when centralized 
power declined and authorities faced civil unrest. The imperial court was 
forced to charge buke (aristocratic warrior clan) leaders with the responsibility 
of suppressing rebellions in the provinces. These rebellions were instigated by 
other buke leaders, a situation that persisted until important warrior lords 
themselves took power at the end of the twelfth century.
 In the eighth century warrior families in the provinces began to gather in 
groups under the leadership of clan heads of buke families. Groups of warriors 
usually included the sons of the lord, his brothers and relatives, members of 
side branches, and also some men not connected with the lord by blood ties, 
such as followers or servants. As for the internal hierarchy of the clan, the ie 
no ko (literally “sons of the household”), i.e. blood relatives, were ranked 
below the lord. They were followed by the kenin (vassals), who were not rela-
tives, but treated as if they were; the rōtō (employees or servants), who served 
the lord in times of peace and followed him into war; and the genin (subordi-
nates), or shoju (followers, squires, stablemen, and farmers), who took care of 
horses, equipment, and food. Loyalty to the lord was rewarded with material 
benefits: his men lived in his house and received war chests and the land 
taken from the enemy after a battle.
 Loyalty bonds were essential within the group. Personal ties, not formal-
ized by official ceremony, were deep and indissoluble and were restricted to 
the lord. Loyalty to the lord was so extreme that the warrior was even willing 
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to give his own life for the lord. Courage and honor (family reputation) were 
the guiding values of a warrior, while cowardice led to a dishonor only death 
could erase. An honorable death was seen as a warrior’s natural destiny, and 
was idealistically accepted and pursued as the culmination of a life spent in 
service to the lord.
 In the tenth and eleventh centuries, as social unrest and disorder increased 
in the provinces, the warrior class became more and more involved in poli-
tics, taking on the highest positions in the provincial government. Leaders still 
belonged to the buke, which were branch families of the kuge (aristocratic 
class). Therefore, political power was strictly connected with genealogy (i.e. 
aristocratic lineage).
 Later, perennial internal disorder led to local peacekeeping activity being 
assumed by local warriors who became officials of district or provincial 
governments. To increase the influence and power of their families, they 
eventually started holding office through inheritance.
 Meanwhile, some regional alliances of local warrior groups were formed 
when nobles were called on by the imperial court to quell rebellions by local 
bands of warriors that had become too powerful and were unwilling to 
submit to central authority. The chiefs of these regional alliances were of 
aristocratic origins as well.
 In conclusion, until the twelfth century, ideological conflicts between the 
aristocracy and those who ruled did not occur, as the latter continued to serve 
the interests of court nobles. The Taira and Minamoto, the powerful warrior 
clans that were involved in political life at the turn of the century, were 
connected with the imperial family just as were the court nobles. Like local 
warriors in the provinces, they followed the “Way of the horse and bow.” 
They regarded dying in battle as the highest honor; family reputation was of 
supreme consideration. Each clan’s banner was carried into battle to assert the 
family name and to show prowess in the face of danger and death.
3	 Kamakura	Shogunate
 The formation of political power at local and later regional levels gradu-
ally led to the establishment of a military government based in Kamakura 
(known as the Bakufu or Shogunate) by 1192. The regional power of 
Minamoto Yoritomo (1142–1199) was based on a network of personal ties 
that originally had no national validity. Actually, the loyalty bond between 
Yoritomo and his vassals required no legitimacy from above. By the end of 
1190 Yoritomo had obtained imperial approval for the appointment of his 
go-kenin as shugo (military provincial administrators) and jitō (estate 
managers). Later, when he was appointed Shōgun, Yoritomo modeled the 
patriarchal structure of the new government on ancient clan organization and 
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superposition of the private and public spheres. Once the new government 
was established, shugo and jitō were officially placed under the Shōgun, both 
by virtue of their personal bonds with Yoritomo and because they submitted 
to public authority. In fact, their appointments were now legitimized at a 
national level.
 Yoritomo strove to limit the number of go-kenin and to grant them elite 
status. The go-kenin swore allegiance to him and were often accepted amongst 
their followers through a process of adoption or marriage. Family ties with 
the head of the clan were more important than appointments. Collapse of the 
centralized power of the Hōjō clan took place over many years due to the 
weakening of family ties and to the partitioning of the private lands of the 
go-kenin into lots assigned posthumously to their heirs.
 Nevertheless, supreme legitimacy was attained through family ties with 
the kuge.1 These were still very strong in the Minamoto era. Thus, even if 
Kamakura officials gradually became more powerful in shōen internal affairs, 
such as dispute resolutions or tax collection, they did not replace imperial 
government officials but were appointed to the same posts and collaborated 
with them for some time. The Bakufu did not abolish most of the privileges 
and institutions of court nobles, but attempted gradually to limit their influ-
ence. The court was both a direct and indirect source of legitimacy since 
Shōgun were appointed by the Emperor and common ancestors had a divine 
origin.
 Warriors were the new holders of political power; they began to feel the 
need to explain the reasons for, and to justify, their supremacy. In gunki 
monogatari (war tales), values such as the ability to administer land and to 
possess political expertise and knowledge of diplomacy were much less 
important than the art of the sword and samurai virtues. A few years after the 
end of the wars that led to the establishment of the Shogunate, the heroism 
and deeds of courageous warriors were recorded in the war tales, together 
with a strong sense of awareness of the brevity of life and of respect for the 
clan’s name.
 Political, economic,2 military, and religious changes led to new social 
conditions under which a new segment of society came to threaten the estab-
 1 Ties between the military aristocracy and court nobles were very strong. As an 
example, when Yoritomo’s second son, Sanetomo, was assassinated in 1219, 
the Minamoto line ran out. The Hōjō regents held power, but in 1225 a kuge 
was appointed Shōgun for the first time. This was Kujō Yoritsune (1218–56), 
who was related to the Fujiwara and Minamoto families.
 2 Emergence of warriors on the political scene contributed to economic develop-
ment. Shugo, jitō, and go-kenin were sent all over the country and created a 
wide class of consumers.
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lished order. The rise of political participation at a lower level reflected not 
only the indifference of absentee landlords to land administration (later 
devolving into inability), but once again, to the spread of Chinese civilization. 
A renewed Buddhism3 offered new ways to access truth and to explain and 
legitimize contemporary events and changes. Buddhism, which was a sophis-
ticated and aristocratic religion in the classic periods, became accessible to 
the common people (e.g. Pure Land, Zen, and Nichiren Buddhism), through 
simplified thought and minimized rituals. At a philosophical level, pluralism 
in ideas spread; instead of pursuing an overarching framework of doctrines, 
sects proliferated. The elaborate rituals and complex doctrines of classic 
Buddhism and the exclusivity of the Tendai and Shingon schools, which 
discredited themselves by being involved in political and military affairs, 
hardly suited the needs of the bushi. Therefore, during the Kamakura period, 
the latter adopted Zen Buddhism, which was congenial to a lifestyle based on 
discipline and self-control. To practice Zen meditation and follow Zen 
Buddhist principles, higher education and wealth were unnecessary, but 
mental vitality and strong willpower were. This was believed to enable 
reaching the innermost depths of the soul/mind to find truth, and to transform 
it into action. With Zen Buddhism, the samurai found a source of legitimacy 
for and within their actions.
4	 Ashikaga	Shogunate	and	the	Sengoku	era:	alliances	and	betrayals
 Soon after Yoritomo died members of the Hōjō clan became regents. Some 
generations later the bond of loyalty between the Bakufu and the vassals 
started to weaken. This was due to a number of reasons, such as division of 
land, increasing complexity of institutions, the emergence of new warrior 
clans, the appearance of many samurai of humble origins on the political 
scene, and particularly to regent government policy. The Hōjō actually 
favored the appointment of family members. Owing to poor administration, 
the Kamakura Bakufu was still indebted to many warrior families and priests, 
having been unable to pay them for their military and spiritual help during the 
invasion attempts of the Mongols in 1274 and 1281. Ultimately the Hōjō 
were unable to resist Emperor Go-Daigo’s takeover of power, known as the 
Kenmu Restoration (1333–1336), which caused the end of the first shogu-
 3 The spread of Buddhism had considerable political and economic consequences. 
Schools run by Buddhist temples offered mathematics, religious, and moral 
education to many warriors and monks who needed a minimum of culture to 
fulfil their duties, and to merchants and village heads who needed to be able 
to read and write to run administrative affairs. Moreover, Zen (Chan) monks 
from China actively participated in trade by providing Japanese markets with 
products such as swords and luxury goods for the emergent warrior class.
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nate.
 The Ashikaga Shōgun were unable to improve the situation. Like the 
Minamoto they tried to combine public authority and personal loyalty bonds 
by appointing their vassals as governors and officials. The Shōgun forced 
them to reside in Kyoto, the imperial capital, where they themselves lived, 
thus enabling the Shōgun to have more control over their actions. For over a 
century their power was based on a fragile alliance with the shugo, who 
tended to run provincial land autonomously and had no interest in over-
throwing the Ashikaga since they served as a source of legitimacy.
 The breaking point came with the Ōnin War (1467–1477). As the war 
spread throughout the country, it led to total decentralization and a shift of 
authority towards the local élite. While it was impossible for court nobles to 
attain power, families of the shugo and powerful clans fought for survival, 
land, and power in the provinces. This was achieved by making and breaking 
up alliances and supporting opposite imperial lines based on personal advan-
tage, and by accepting local warriors among their bands. Meanwhile, many 
local squires rebelled against the shugo and appeared upon the political scene. 
Although they were subject to the authority of government officials, they had 
no personal ties to them, nor did they take an oath of allegiance. They 
created semi-independent fiefdoms and enlarged them at the expense of their 
neighbors. This process was called gekokujō (“the low overcomes the high”). 
Foot soldiers became essential, with palisades and castles becoming 
commonplace. In the sixteenth century, castle towns were built, protected by 
ramparts and moats and surrounded by vassals’ residences.
 The gunki monogatari written in this period tell in a vigorous manner 
samurai ambition for power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They are 
full of praise for military success and courage on the battlefield. They are 
similar to epic poems, yet differ from the first warrior tales in that no special 
attention is given to social status or noble origins. Success in battle alone 
gave moral sanction to samurai conduct, including actions that would now be 
considered betrayal.
 Ambition for power and volte-faces became the norm. The Zen monk 
Takuan Sōhō’s (1573–1645) words on loyalty to the lord were useful at this 
time. Takuan wrote in the Reiroshū that to a samurai, the lord is shijū ichinin, 
“the same from the beginning to the end,” meaning that although he serves 
different lords, the idea of “lord” exists in the samurai’s mind, and is not tied 
to a specific individual.
 Moreover, the sense of duty to one’s lord (giri) went beyond loyalty (chū) 
to the Shōgun, which was politically non-existent or not even considered. 
Ruth Benedict in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) wrote about a 
daimyō in the twelfth century who was ordered by a Minamoto shōgun to 
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hand over an enemy lord whom he had granted asylum. The daimyō replied 
with a letter in which he expressed his indignation over the offence against 
his giri duty. He added that public affairs did not depend on him, but that giri 
between men of honor was an eternal and indisputable truth. He therefore 
refused to be disloyal to his friends.
 In the sixteenth century a number of opposing parties entered the field. 
More solid defensive structures were built to defend against newly introduced 
weapons such as firearms. Many peasants were employed by daimyō to form 
armies of tens of thousands of temporary soldiers. The relationship between 
the lord and vassal changed. It was now based on personal investiture and on 
an oath of allegiance more than on family ties. In this period of political frag-
mentation, boundless ambitions flourished and a rich peasant or merchant 
could become a samurai.
 With the gradual weakening of kinship ties, which involved allegiances 
not based on chū, written laws having official significance became necessary 
to formalize the relationship between lord and vassal. While defending the 
lords against restrictions from the government, legal codes provided legiti-
macy to the daimyo, who themselves had to respect them. Therefore these 
codes ensured that the lord would not be considered a dictator who exercised 
power by virtue of his military strength, but a defender of the established 
order.
 In the Sengoku period the local power structure shifted from a kinship to 
an institutionalized level. The lords at war (sengoku daimyō) became local 
lords (shōhoku daimyō) who had absolute authority within their domains. By 
the end of the sixteenth century they had become pre-modern lords (kinsei 
daimyō). At the same time, samurai were forced to move from the fields and 
live in castle towns, despite resistance from minor samurai who were engaged 
in agriculture in peacetime (jizamurai). During the last decades of the 
sixteenth century daimyō tried to increase their power by adopting directions 
from the Shogunate in their domains, such as conducting censuses on popula-
tion, weapons, land, and economic resources. Measures were taken to tie 
peasants to the land. Separated from the rest of the population, vassals were 
given salaries rather than fiefdoms, were expected to follow laws concerning 
their military forces, and were more strictly controlled. Since they were 
placed in the position of being unable to forge strong ties with their men, the 
occurrence of armed uprisings was partly prevented.
 Many military households, including those created during the Sengoku 
period, established solid fiefdoms. Only a few were from shugo families; the 
majority were from medium and low level samurai. The gunki monogatari of 
this period celebrated acclaim derived from action and success. Nonetheless, 
the buke families of ancient origin always looked at “newcomers” with suspi-
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cion, which is why sometimes a family came to “discover” its ancient buke 
origins.
5	 Unification	of	Japan	and	the	Tokugawa	Shogunate:		
a	legitimacy	issue	and	the	sublimation	of	loyalty
 Lineage was an obstacle to Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi. 
Though they became the most powerful men in the country they did not 
descend from the Minamoto clan and therefore could not be appointed 
Shōgun. In need of legitimacy, they both boasted of their descent from other 
lines of the imperial family. But this was not enough. Oda received the most 
important appointments within the court nobility, but after rejecting them all 
he used the concept of tenkafubu (dominate the world through weapons) to 
create an autonomous legitimacy for his power. Toyotomi had very humble 
origins, since he came from a peasant family. His rise to power was enabled 
by his adoption by Konoe Sakihisa (1538–1612), who descended from 
Fujiwara Michinaga (966–1027) through appointments within the nobility. He 
also became imperial regent (kanpaku) through descent from the Toyotomi 
family. Vassals swore allegiance in 1588 by the Jurakutei oath. To prevent 
others from following his path and emulate his incredible rise to power, he 
ordered the separation of samurai and peasants and disarmed the latter 
through the sword hunt (katanagari).
 Tokugawa Ieyasu, in contrast, boasted of descent from the Minamoto clan, 
asserting that he was related to Nitta Yoshisada (1301–1338), the warrior 
leader who destroyed the Hōjō. Therefore, he had no reason to aim at 
appointments within the court nobility and found legitimacy within the 
shogunal institution itself. After he was appointed Shōgun he imposed laws 
that gained official significance. Vassals swore allegiance at Nijō Castle in 
1611. Oaths of allegiance to Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu had 
official significance; they ended the relationship between the Shōgun and his 
vassals based on personal bonds. Legal codes in the Sengoku period, and laws 
and oaths in the Tokugawa period served as evidence of the existence of 
daimyō authority and were also a source of legitimacy.
 Ieyasu’s political establishment was based on a rigid bureaucratic structure 
rather than on personal relationships between the Shōgun and his daimyō. 
Marriage and adoption policies were implemented to ensure the endurance of 
clans, and their “right” to run the country. Other measures were undertaken 
by the Shogunate in order to ensure daimyō loyalty to the Shōgun and to 
prevent them from making “dangerous” alliances or becoming too powerful. 
Firstly, the Tokugawa shogunate accepted clans that submitted to the 
Shogunate structure(tozama, the “non-Tokugawa” or “outside” daimyō), and 
allowed sub-government autonomy in fiefdoms (han), whilst at a national level 
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they only appointed traditional vassals (fudai) to positions related to the 
Shogunate. Secondly, Laws for the Military Houses (buke shohatto) were 
issued from 1615 to provide instructions to daimyō on their lifestyles and 
duties. Thirdly, standardized practices, such as the “alternate residence” 
system (sankin-kōtai), were adopted to allow better control over daimyō and 
to set limits on their incomes by forcing them to use some of their economic 
resources for the journey to Edo and back to the fiefdom, for the second resi-
dence, and for services to the Shōgun.
 During the Tokugawa period the values associated with “the Way of the 
Warrior” (Bushidō) were formalized and a sense of unselfish duty was empha-
sized. The philosopher and military strategist Yamaga Sokō (1622–1685), 
alongside other scholars, drew upon elements from Confucianism, Buddhism, 
and Shintoism in order to create a philosophy that supported Bushidō and 
create legitimacy for the warriors’ supremacy over the population. Since none 
of the Tokugawa shōgun could achieve the same great military deeds as 
Ieyasu, he was deified so as to legitimate the office of his heirs.
 At a lower level the bond between the daimyō and his samurai within the 
fiefdom was less personal than before. Since daimyō were appointed by the 
Shōgun there were no kinship ties with his men. Moreover, the sankin-kōtai 
system was an obstacle itself, because it kept the daimyō and his family 
permanently away from the fiefdom and its population. This was true in 
theory. Actually, the samurai, being confined to their fiefdoms, often devel-
oped a very deep affection for their daimyō. An oath of allegiance became a 
formal act, though it was still sincerely felt. A famous example of this 
extreme sense of loyalty is found in Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s (1659–1721) 
Hagakure (The Book of the Samurai), in which the author expresses a strong 
gratitude for the opportunity to devote his entire life to his lord. The stage 
play Chūshingura is another well-known example of this unreserved devotion. 
It deals with the true story of forty-seven rōnin who avenge their lord when 
he was forced to commit suicide after reacting to an injustice.
6	 The	Bakumatsu	period	and	national	bushidō in the Meiji:	
the	Emperor	as	unique	lord
 During the Bakumatsu period the Shōgun lost the support of many daimyō, 
who accused him of being unable to accomplish his mission to protect Japan 
from Westerners. Their support of the restoration of the Emperor’s political 
supremacy was, of course, due to their ambition to gain power as well, and to 
actively participate in the politics of the country. Internal disorders included 
feuds aimed at destroying the Shogunate (this was especially true of the 
Satsuma and Chōshū clans), along with the incursion of foreign ships and 
residents. At the end of the civil war Yoshinobu (1837–1913), the fifteenth 
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and last Tokugawa Shōgun, delivered the Shogunal capital Edo into the hands 
of the Emperor’s partisans. Imperial power (Ōsei fukko) was re-established in 
January 1868. During the Meiji restoration (Meiji ishin), Japan rapidly became 
a modern country, politically, economically, and militarily. However, modern-
ization came at a cost. A sacrifice was asked of the samurai, too, and with the 
social reform of 1872 they lost their privileged status.
 Nonetheless, many warrior family members maintained continuity in 
regional administration and through employment in business activities that 
contributed to the persistence of some of the principles of the warrior tradi-
tion. Moreover, the latter were “adopted” by the government at a national 
level in order to increase the sense of loyalty to the lord. The contemporary 
lord was personified in a society renewed, in the company employer, or in the 
office boss, or the village head, but ultimately in the Emperor. The Japanese 
sovereign was actually to be considered a god on earth and the source of 
protection for all Japanese. A distance was put between him and his subjects 
because of his quality of being divine, so that it was impossible for common 
people to even know what his face looked like. However, in contrast with his 
role in the Tokugawa era, he was to be remembered by each individual at all 
times. The Meiji oligarchy’s purpose in creating an ideology that supported 
government policies of national modernization and strengthening was to 
ensure that Japanese subjects carried out their duties with utmost effort and 
lived with the consciousness that sacrificing action and life to the Emperor 
was good. At the end of the Meiji era examples of extreme devotion to the 
Emperor were no less meaningful than those we find in the Shogunate period. 
The well-known seppuku of General Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912), and of his 
wife, who sacrificed her life soon after him by committing jigai at the death 
of the Meiji Emperor, are certainly examples of this.
 Samurai revolts against the new social establishment and loss of traditional 
values due to modernization (westernization) occurred in the first years of the 
Meiji era. However, it is interesting to note that some of the revolts were 
expressly conducted in the name of the Emperor.
7	 Conclusion	
Loyalty	to	the	lord:	an	external	value	or	of	indigenous	origin?
 From their origin to their later manifestation in the Meiji era, warriors 
maintained a sense of allegiance to the lord that was central and somehow 
compulsory, a duty inwardly felt. Loyalty to the lord, and the blood ties that 
were closely related to it, were considered of great “value.” In the distant past 
heroic deeds determined merit and glory. Merit itself was transmitted to heirs 
through blood lines as an inner quality. In times of disorder and war, when 
low level warriors managed to impose themselves on the political scene (e.g. 
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Sengoku jidai), there was great need for blood-legitimacy. The importance of 
the hierarchical order in Japanese society finds its origins in the distant past 
(Yayoi era, ca. 300 B.C.–ca. 300 A.D.). Undeniably, Chinese Confucianism 
lent support to the Japanese system of social relationships, especially when 
the latter were particularly rigid. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, for 
example, the mibunsei status system of Neo-Confucian inspiration legitimized 
the prohibition to change status.
 However, in the “peaceful” Tokugawa era the supremacy of the samurai 
was questioned owing to the dissatisfaction of other classes with being domi-
nated by an oppressive class that had lost its natural warring role. Discussions 
on Confucianism took place throughout this period. During the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries such discussions examined the legitimation of the new 
order dictated by the Tokugawa, and later the legitimation of the warriors’ 
domination over Japanese society. The Shogunate especially emphasized Chu 
Hsi’s orthodox Neo-Confucianism regulating the relationship between the 
sovereign and the subject. However, at the end of the seventeenth century 
some philosophers began referring to the Ōyomei school of heterodox 
Neo-Confucianism that emphasized interiority, mind, and intuition. Ogyū 
Sorai (1666–1728) and Ishida Baigan (1685–1744) were the two main figures 
in this debate. Other intellectuals, such as Yamaga Sokō and Hirata Atsutane 
(1776–1843) tried to bridge the gap between the samurai ideal and reality in 
order to allow the warrior to claim a prestige that derived from righteous and 
noble behavior. The way to this ideal was through the purity of the indige-
nous tradition. Warriors in the Tokugawa era were actually encouraged to 
follow ancient samurai virtues to gain self-legitimizing power.
 In the Meiji era devotion to the Emperor, promoted and imposed by the 
government oligarchy, reproduced at a national level the samurai sense of 
loyalty toward their daimyō at a local level. While this ideal was necessary to 
justify the acts of rebellious daimyō against the Shogunate during the 
Bakumatsu period, it became a national ideological structure glorifying the 
uniqueness of the Japanese imperial system, people, and country.
 More than half a century ago, Ruth Benedict pointed out (1946) the two 
terms that express Japanese ideas of duty, gimu and giri. The first derives from 
gratitude for being born in this world (cfr. Confucianism and Buddhism); the 
second from a series of feelings, ranging from gratitude for a favor received 
to a dishonor to avenge. Giri necessarily requires the return of a debt (on) in 
order to restore equilibrium. Within the warrior class duty was towards 
parents, name (clan) and, above all, the lord. Until the Tokugawa era, a 
samurai had a duty towards his daimyō for giving him employment, i.e. a 
means to earn a living for his family. Takuan Sōhō expresses this concept 
with the following words:
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[…] from the time one has been taken into a daimyo’s service, of the 
clothes on his back, the sword he wears at his side, his footgear, his 
palanquin, his horse and all of his materiel, there is no single item that 
is not due to the favor of his lord. Family, wife, child and his own 
retainers—all of them and their relations—not one can be said not to 
receive the lord’s favor. Having these favors well impressed on his mind, 
a man will face his lord’s opponents on the battlefield and cast away his 
one life. This is dying for right-mindedness. This is not for the sake of 
one’s name. Nor for gaining fame, a stipend and a fief. Receiving a 
favor and returning a favor—the sincerity of the core of the mind 
consists solely of this. (Reiroshū, translation by W. Scott Wilson 1987:22)
 In conclusion, the heart of the discourse may be found in the quality of 
being “natural” in the sense of loyalty to the lord, as was true for blood ties 
and divinity of the Emperor and the country. This quality corresponds to 
being autochthonous. Attempts were made to generalize and universalize duty 
towards the lord in periods of disorder (convenient loyalty or treachery) and 
the Tokugawa era (service to the lord’s successor after the lord’s death, 
keeping in mind the idea of the lord). Nonetheless, loyalty in Japan appears 
to possess an inner quality that is necessarily directed to one particular indi-
vidual. This naturally led, in the Meiji era, to the whole population being seen 
as indebted to the Emperor. Though the influence of philosophical and social 
systems of Chinese origin is undeniable in Japanese society and the warrior 
class,4 one is tempted to analyze how deeply Japanese intellectuals and 
samurai considered this influence. How they tried to limit Chinese influence 
to a corroboration of values already existing in Japanese society, as can be 
seen in the strong tendency already extant in the Tokugawa era to consider 
the country and features of Japan, will be the subject of further study.
 4 Daimyō were instructed to study Chinese works on strategy. These instructions 
are found in the Shogunate Buke Shohatto and in private letters (wills) of 
daimyō to their heirs. Cfr. Itakura Shigenori
